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Blakdayzed and confused
Generally discussions of scientific method, which are not opinions espoused by the dazed, is not directed to adults that still go by gamer’s names and hide in anonymity.
However, the lack of reading and general misperception of construct is a learning opportunity for the rest of us where hope still springs eternal.
[BLAKDAYZ point 1 – OTP is, without the pad, impossible to break when the keyset does not repeat.]
In fact, that is exactly the point of the technology. It is probably not fun to try to hack security when it is secure.
[BLAKDAYZ point 3 – In the pki real world interception of the key (or pad) would be critical to breaking the cipher.]
But there is none with a dynamic distributed key system where there is only one, one-time distribution of a pre-authenticated key. Your analysis, like many of Bruce’s, demonstrates that one should read before writing. Even better, actually perform tests. It seems as if the world has been changing while you have been stuck in your pki Matrix.
The contest key is a static Whitenoise key. Although the BS Clock http://www.wnlabs.com/news/Schneier_Challenge_Clock.php shows how many times a dynamic offset on such a deployed key in DIVA would have changed, this is not part of this challenge contest. It is simply to show you the scale of the problem a hacker faces in this real world.
We are saying you cannot break a static, fixed Whitenoise key let alone one that has invoked dynamism. http://www.wnlabs.com/pdf/UVIC_Performance_Analysis.pdf
[BLAKDAYZ - Without your real world implementation, an attack on a one time pad without the pad or a machine/code that auto-generates one...is pointless.]
You have whined about this earlier. In capable hands, attack scenarios, like side channel attacks as well a mathematical ones, are constructed in an attempt to construct/reconstruct information that is not available to a hacker by other means. Historically – during enigma times for example – swimming into a sunken submarine in frigid waters was one of the extra-ordinary means taken to “get the pad.”
Please feel free to contact and team with the University of Victoria on the two year National Research Council funded side channel attack studies. They have a real world implementation of Whitenoise deployed on an FPGA chip. They worked at constructing attack scenarios. After two years, a student there published a paper with unsupported statements kinda like you. Feel free to use their work and follow their implementation.
Exactly because the key is needed to do dirty work is why side channel attacks, and other approaches, were devised and continue to be devised by the capable in the first place. These approaches attempt to create a sufficient crib from physical real world data in order to recreate the key which is otherwise unavailable. Or they attempt to come up with another way of stealing a key.
In this contest – discounting an implementation of DIVA where these keys are invoked to operate dynamically (like on the BS Clock http://www.wnlabs.com/news/Schneier_Challenge_Clock.php ) - the key is similarly static.
No one has been able to break a single, static WN key. http://www.wnlabs.com/pdf/UVIC_Performance_Analysis.pdf
[So you generate a OTP of 1M bytes.]
This is the first misread and misunderstanding.
WN generates key streams greater than 10 to the 60th power bytes in length. It effectively acts as both a random number generator (not even statistical randomness errors following the NIST test suite) and in proper implementation it operates as an OTP.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51gqPzEHXSA
We are in fact giving fearsome hackers like Blakdayz a head start on what isn’t in fact available in the DDKI real world – any meaningful portion of key stream (at most in some contexts a token is transmitted.)
The one time pad is not 1000000 bytes but rather we are giving you a million bytes of from a key stream that can easily exceed 10 to the 60th power bytes in length.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51gqPzEHXSA
We are giving you one million bytes of the key stream that is produced by a unique key. And it is static for this contest.
[BLAKDAYZ] (1) OTP is, without the pad, impossible to break when the keyset does not repeat.
2) Asking someone to break with without the one time pad is a farce]
In fact, your analysis is more farcical and certainly exhibits misunderstanding and poor homework skills. If you study how DIVA works when implemented with a Whitenoise key and the fact that after one-time key distribution that there is no offset exchange you might understand why your analysis is meaningless and your attempt would be unsuccessful – if you had the nerve to try instead of editorialize. But that is what is exposed with the BS Challenge Clock.
Point 1 sounds like a hacker raising the white flag. That is the reality of what you have to work with in the new world. Your inability to know how to proceed is the first stark indication that you are stymied by this kind of IT security control.
Even as you recognize you need more to help you in your efforts, let’s look at how things have always been done. Why do you need a different set of rules?
PKI public key prime number composites have been the subject of innumerable breaking (factoring) challenges over literally decades if one studies RSA. RSA apparently discontinued running these challenges because it became pretty well accepted that this “secret sauce one-way function”, a prime number composite, could be broken (factored) even with relatively inefficient sieve methods. These contests obviously didn’t offer anything more than the key. One downloaded it and started to sieve… or attempted other kinds of attack approaches. (To note: Whitenoise is not factorable because of how the keys are constructed.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=GwkwgR_78dQ&feature=youtu.be
Now granted, in traditional cryptanalysis and attack you need 50% of key stream and some plain text etc. The contest is constructed to reflect how a DDKI world looks to a hacker and to address an unproven attack claim that a key can be reconstructed with 30,000 bytes of key stream information. (This has never been proven and to be kind we are providing 13.3 times as much key stream information as was claimed needed.)
http://www.wnlabs.com/WhitenoiseSecurityChallenge/
Because the key streams are exponential, and yet can be stored in a very tiny relative footprint, keys are distributed one time following Level 4 identity proofing. A person or device would never need another key. This is like giving a person a driver’s license, but someone would have to look at you in your face and get your real name.
This distributed key scenario is why the framework is called a Dynamic Distributed Key Infrastructure. But in the PKI real world, accurate reading or writing doesn’t appear to be a requirement.
Just as the Blakdayz’d and confused analysis is faulty, so is the PKI construct with that exact vulnerable key exchange which is why it isn’t integrated directly into distributed key systems (the two systems can run in parallel.) Proper deployment in fact fixes that fatal flaw of PKI. See Fellow Yellow.
It is a white flag when you are acknowledging that you need more information than the real world would provide you.
3) In the real world, you would have to transfer the pad to those who wanted to communicate. Interception of that pad would be critical to breaking the cipher... In real comms you would have to transfer the pad...
Done electronically, you have just articulated the fatal flaw of asymmetric public key systems – MiM attacks.
Because of this, in properly implemented DIVA systems, DIVA is invoked at point of network access and then runs in parallel with other security controls and frameworks like PKI. A hacker is forced to break both a symmetric (dynamic) and asymmetric key simultaneously for each and every key or offset. This approach is taken to fix the fatal flaw of asymmetric systems to MiM because that asymmetric key cannot be broken without detection by the distributed system – and as you seem to be admitting, you can’t break a distributed Whitenoise key.
Creating a two-channel (asymmetric and symmetric framework), multi-factor authentication protocol is the only response to the reality that the majority of systems globally are protected with some flavor of pki, even with the fatal flaw. That has made your world a little too simple.
This approach is then like cleaning up an oil spill. Surround the mess and keep it from spreading. Then over time, redundant or unnecessary and expensive portions of asymmetric systems can be removed without security risk.
[BLAKDAYZ]
so either
A) pad has to be encrypted by a PKI scheme or
An electronically distributed key could not be captured (in a MiM scenario) on the one time key distribution, enrollment, authentication and activation and used without detection.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6qaKkV9GJU
B) sent via a different medium than the encrypted method or
Level 4 Identity Proofing
C) use a pre-sharedkey ...which you don't include the mechanisms for A,B, or C in your contest (or in your writeups).
To take a look at key distribution by chip set, firmware up-grade or electronic distribution.
http://www.wnlabs.com/downloads/GSC_2013_Show.ppsx
http://connect2canada.com/innovation...-labs/?lang=en
http://www.wnlabs.com/Presentations/...e_Networks.pps
DIVA – in the real world known as Andre Brisson.
Generally discussions of scientific method, which are not opinions espoused by the dazed, is not directed to adults that still go by gamer’s names and hide in anonymity.
However, the lack of reading and general misperception of construct is a learning opportunity for the rest of us where hope still springs eternal.
[BLAKDAYZ point 1 – OTP is, without the pad, impossible to break when the keyset does not repeat.]
In fact, that is exactly the point of the technology. It is probably not fun to try to hack security when it is secure.
[BLAKDAYZ point 3 – In the pki real world interception of the key (or pad) would be critical to breaking the cipher.]
But there is none with a dynamic distributed key system where there is only one, one-time distribution of a pre-authenticated key. Your analysis, like many of Bruce’s, demonstrates that one should read before writing. Even better, actually perform tests. It seems as if the world has been changing while you have been stuck in your pki Matrix.
The contest key is a static Whitenoise key. Although the BS Clock http://www.wnlabs.com/news/Schneier_Challenge_Clock.php shows how many times a dynamic offset on such a deployed key in DIVA would have changed, this is not part of this challenge contest. It is simply to show you the scale of the problem a hacker faces in this real world.
We are saying you cannot break a static, fixed Whitenoise key let alone one that has invoked dynamism. http://www.wnlabs.com/pdf/UVIC_Performance_Analysis.pdf
[BLAKDAYZ - Without your real world implementation, an attack on a one time pad without the pad or a machine/code that auto-generates one...is pointless.]
You have whined about this earlier. In capable hands, attack scenarios, like side channel attacks as well a mathematical ones, are constructed in an attempt to construct/reconstruct information that is not available to a hacker by other means. Historically – during enigma times for example – swimming into a sunken submarine in frigid waters was one of the extra-ordinary means taken to “get the pad.”
Please feel free to contact and team with the University of Victoria on the two year National Research Council funded side channel attack studies. They have a real world implementation of Whitenoise deployed on an FPGA chip. They worked at constructing attack scenarios. After two years, a student there published a paper with unsupported statements kinda like you. Feel free to use their work and follow their implementation.
Exactly because the key is needed to do dirty work is why side channel attacks, and other approaches, were devised and continue to be devised by the capable in the first place. These approaches attempt to create a sufficient crib from physical real world data in order to recreate the key which is otherwise unavailable. Or they attempt to come up with another way of stealing a key.
In this contest – discounting an implementation of DIVA where these keys are invoked to operate dynamically (like on the BS Clock http://www.wnlabs.com/news/Schneier_Challenge_Clock.php ) - the key is similarly static.
No one has been able to break a single, static WN key. http://www.wnlabs.com/pdf/UVIC_Performance_Analysis.pdf
[So you generate a OTP of 1M bytes.]
This is the first misread and misunderstanding.
WN generates key streams greater than 10 to the 60th power bytes in length. It effectively acts as both a random number generator (not even statistical randomness errors following the NIST test suite) and in proper implementation it operates as an OTP.
See: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51gqPzEHXSA
We are in fact giving fearsome hackers like Blakdayz a head start on what isn’t in fact available in the DDKI real world – any meaningful portion of key stream (at most in some contexts a token is transmitted.)
The one time pad is not 1000000 bytes but rather we are giving you a million bytes of from a key stream that can easily exceed 10 to the 60th power bytes in length.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=51gqPzEHXSA
We are giving you one million bytes of the key stream that is produced by a unique key. And it is static for this contest.
[BLAKDAYZ] (1) OTP is, without the pad, impossible to break when the keyset does not repeat.
2) Asking someone to break with without the one time pad is a farce]
In fact, your analysis is more farcical and certainly exhibits misunderstanding and poor homework skills. If you study how DIVA works when implemented with a Whitenoise key and the fact that after one-time key distribution that there is no offset exchange you might understand why your analysis is meaningless and your attempt would be unsuccessful – if you had the nerve to try instead of editorialize. But that is what is exposed with the BS Challenge Clock.
Point 1 sounds like a hacker raising the white flag. That is the reality of what you have to work with in the new world. Your inability to know how to proceed is the first stark indication that you are stymied by this kind of IT security control.
Even as you recognize you need more to help you in your efforts, let’s look at how things have always been done. Why do you need a different set of rules?
PKI public key prime number composites have been the subject of innumerable breaking (factoring) challenges over literally decades if one studies RSA. RSA apparently discontinued running these challenges because it became pretty well accepted that this “secret sauce one-way function”, a prime number composite, could be broken (factored) even with relatively inefficient sieve methods. These contests obviously didn’t offer anything more than the key. One downloaded it and started to sieve… or attempted other kinds of attack approaches. (To note: Whitenoise is not factorable because of how the keys are constructed.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=GwkwgR_78dQ&feature=youtu.be
Now granted, in traditional cryptanalysis and attack you need 50% of key stream and some plain text etc. The contest is constructed to reflect how a DDKI world looks to a hacker and to address an unproven attack claim that a key can be reconstructed with 30,000 bytes of key stream information. (This has never been proven and to be kind we are providing 13.3 times as much key stream information as was claimed needed.)
http://www.wnlabs.com/WhitenoiseSecurityChallenge/
Because the key streams are exponential, and yet can be stored in a very tiny relative footprint, keys are distributed one time following Level 4 identity proofing. A person or device would never need another key. This is like giving a person a driver’s license, but someone would have to look at you in your face and get your real name.
This distributed key scenario is why the framework is called a Dynamic Distributed Key Infrastructure. But in the PKI real world, accurate reading or writing doesn’t appear to be a requirement.
Just as the Blakdayz’d and confused analysis is faulty, so is the PKI construct with that exact vulnerable key exchange which is why it isn’t integrated directly into distributed key systems (the two systems can run in parallel.) Proper deployment in fact fixes that fatal flaw of PKI. See Fellow Yellow.
It is a white flag when you are acknowledging that you need more information than the real world would provide you.
3) In the real world, you would have to transfer the pad to those who wanted to communicate. Interception of that pad would be critical to breaking the cipher... In real comms you would have to transfer the pad...
Done electronically, you have just articulated the fatal flaw of asymmetric public key systems – MiM attacks.
Because of this, in properly implemented DIVA systems, DIVA is invoked at point of network access and then runs in parallel with other security controls and frameworks like PKI. A hacker is forced to break both a symmetric (dynamic) and asymmetric key simultaneously for each and every key or offset. This approach is taken to fix the fatal flaw of asymmetric systems to MiM because that asymmetric key cannot be broken without detection by the distributed system – and as you seem to be admitting, you can’t break a distributed Whitenoise key.
Creating a two-channel (asymmetric and symmetric framework), multi-factor authentication protocol is the only response to the reality that the majority of systems globally are protected with some flavor of pki, even with the fatal flaw. That has made your world a little too simple.
This approach is then like cleaning up an oil spill. Surround the mess and keep it from spreading. Then over time, redundant or unnecessary and expensive portions of asymmetric systems can be removed without security risk.
[BLAKDAYZ]
so either
A) pad has to be encrypted by a PKI scheme or
An electronically distributed key could not be captured (in a MiM scenario) on the one time key distribution, enrollment, authentication and activation and used without detection.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c6qaKkV9GJU
B) sent via a different medium than the encrypted method or
Level 4 Identity Proofing
C) use a pre-sharedkey ...which you don't include the mechanisms for A,B, or C in your contest (or in your writeups).
To take a look at key distribution by chip set, firmware up-grade or electronic distribution.
http://www.wnlabs.com/downloads/GSC_2013_Show.ppsx
http://connect2canada.com/innovation...-labs/?lang=en
http://www.wnlabs.com/Presentations/...e_Networks.pps
DIVA – in the real world known as Andre Brisson.
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