anyone else see this article in last week's Guardian?
Q. What could a boarding pass tell an identity fraudster about you? A. Way too much
the piece describes how the relatively small (and considered by many to be worthless) piece of paper, discovered in a dumpster dive, allowed the author and a his coputer-savvy friend to easily uncover the taveller's personal info, private statistics, etc etc.
this is all made possible, the article claims, by the fact that the american-implemented CAPPS "security" system operates by culling and maintaining vast databases of personal info. information that has absolutely no relevance to your flight (banking details, home life, etc) is tossed about by a wide range of computers, all of which have varying security.
this sort of thing pisses me off to no end, and it is the reason that i will likely plan a flight out to defcon with lots of lead time in order to make a fuss at the airport and possibly demand the right to fly without showing ID. (something i'm told it's possible to do under certain circumstances)
in any case, it's a great example of how baloney, feel-good "security" measures do more to harm us than protect us.
Q. What could a boarding pass tell an identity fraudster about you? A. Way too much
A simple airline stub, picked out of a bin near Heathrow, led Steve Boggan to investigate a shocking breach of security.
This is the story of a piece of paper no bigger than a credit card, thrown away in a dustbin on the Heathrow Express to Paddington station. It was nestling among chewing gum wrappers and baggage tags, cast off by some weary traveller, when I first laid eyes on it just over a month ago.
The traveller's name was Mark Broer. I know this because the paper - actually a flimsy piece of card - was a discarded British Airways boarding-pass stub, the small section of the pass displaying your name and seat number. The stub you probably throw away as soon as you leave your flight.
This is the story of a piece of paper no bigger than a credit card, thrown away in a dustbin on the Heathrow Express to Paddington station. It was nestling among chewing gum wrappers and baggage tags, cast off by some weary traveller, when I first laid eyes on it just over a month ago.
The traveller's name was Mark Broer. I know this because the paper - actually a flimsy piece of card - was a discarded British Airways boarding-pass stub, the small section of the pass displaying your name and seat number. The stub you probably throw away as soon as you leave your flight.
this is all made possible, the article claims, by the fact that the american-implemented CAPPS "security" system operates by culling and maintaining vast databases of personal info. information that has absolutely no relevance to your flight (banking details, home life, etc) is tossed about by a wide range of computers, all of which have varying security.
this sort of thing pisses me off to no end, and it is the reason that i will likely plan a flight out to defcon with lots of lead time in order to make a fuss at the airport and possibly demand the right to fly without showing ID. (something i'm told it's possible to do under certain circumstances)
in any case, it's a great example of how baloney, feel-good "security" measures do more to harm us than protect us.
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