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Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

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  • #31
    Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

    Originally posted by xor View Post
    It's the work of militant Amish Terrorists. The ALO Amish Liberation Organization. Why do you think they wear black.

    xor

    I could always come up there and spray paint ALO on the sides of buildings.
    Amish Ninjas

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    • #32
      Hackers targeting SCADA networks

      http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/200...er-apocalypse/

      According to the McAfee representative in this article, even though the video of a building's light system being hacked was a hoax it is proof that hackers have their eye on these types of systems as a potential target. It seemed logical that hackers would target this sort of system but a bit of a leap in logic to make the assumption from someone making a video like that. Just wondering what other's thoughts were.
      Not every problem, nor every thesis, should be examined, but only one which might puzzle one of those who needs argument

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      • #33
        Re: Hackers targeting SCADA networks

        Originally posted by facon12 View Post
        http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/200...er-apocalypse/

        According to the McAfee representative in this article, even though the video of a building's light system being hacked was a hoax it is proof that hackers have their eye on these types of systems as a potential target. It seemed logical that hackers would target this sort of system but a bit of a leap in logic to make the assumption from someone making a video like that. Just wondering what other's thoughts were.
        There's been a couple of different threads related to this topic.

        When I saw that video, I assumed it was a fake. But it's a well known fact that malicious people are looking closely at SCADA systems. But to date, most attacks against them have been from people on the inside of the targeted network with intimate knowledge of the network.

        Once my friends and I get our webserver back online, I'll have an updated PDF of, at this point, over 600 pages of articles related to SCADA hacking and known attacks.

        BTW, If you watch the video closely, you can see it's an obvious fake:

        > At 16 Seconds, you get a clean shot of the motherboard that is not only leaning against a metal rim of the PLC cabinet which would short it out, but it also has no RAM installed. Kind of tough to run a computer with no RAM.

        > For some unknown reason, the second guy is screwing some circuit board to the inside of a standard computer power supply with some strange antenna protruding from the middle.

        > That same power supply doesn't have a 120V feed plugged into it, but somehow has a light lit. There appears to be a small battery pack plugged into it.

        > They then plug the ATX connector from that into that panel opposite the 'PLC' cabinet. I can't see any reason to do such a thing, since there wasn't a 120V feed from the other side of it.
        Last edited by streaker69; May 27, 2009, 20:28.
        A third party security audit is the IT equivalent of a colonoscopy. It's long, intrusive, very uncomfortable, and when it's done, you'll have seen things you really didn't want to see, and you'll never forget that you've had one.

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        • #34
          Re: Hackers targeting SCADA networks

          Originally posted by streaker69 View Post
          There's been a couple of different threads related to this topic.
          Yep!
          Merged.

          facon12, consider looking for recent threads on the same topic with a forum search. This thread that your thread was merged with was only 5 days old.

          Thanks!

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          • #35
            Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

            After doing some thinking about this and trying to explain the communication links of my SCADA system to the wife, I decided to actually map out all the different communication paths of my comparatively small system.

            http://img20.imageshack.us/img20/5205/scadalinks.gif

            Now extrapolate this to what the powergrid would be like: Multple makes and models of PLC's, all kinds of different communications types from dedicated Leasedlines, T1, HDSL and probably VPN thrown into the mix. It would be a big complicated system that wouldn't just be a matter of plugging in a laptop that's so often portrayed in TV and discussed in the news, and you suddenly have a display of the entire system.

            Granted, some SCADA systems have moved into the really wrong direction by using things like WebHMI. My place actually purchased WebHMI and it was configured for a short time, but after I couldn't verify one way or another that it was safe, I turned it off.

            I'm sure that you guys looking at this, the wheels are already turning as to where the best place to conduct an attack would be based upon the links, right?
            A third party security audit is the IT equivalent of a colonoscopy. It's long, intrusive, very uncomfortable, and when it's done, you'll have seen things you really didn't want to see, and you'll never forget that you've had one.

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            • #36
              Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

              Wait at 47 seconds, did he hack the lights using Task Manager? He set us up the dual-core!


              I'm hitting the remote unmanned pump station with the 6 foot fence and cheap padlock and chain that's a little too long so I can just open the gate enough to slip in. You know the site the one where there's no intrusion alarm on the door and there's a hide-a-key on the side by the bushes. It has direct access to the OPC server. If I can see the OPC server then I'm in without any specialized programs.

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              • #37
                Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

                Originally posted by beakmyn View Post
                I'm hitting the remote unmanned pump station with the 6 foot fence and cheap padlock and chain that's a little too long so I can just open the gate enough to slip in. You know the site the one where there's no intrusion alarm on the door and there's a hide-a-key on the side by the bushes. It has direct access to the OPC server. If I can see the OPC server then I'm in without any specialized programs.
                You're cheating because you and I have talked about this. :)
                A third party security audit is the IT equivalent of a colonoscopy. It's long, intrusive, very uncomfortable, and when it's done, you'll have seen things you really didn't want to see, and you'll never forget that you've had one.

                Comment


                • #38
                  Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

                  Anyone surprised by this, please stand on your head.

                  Originally posted by TFA
                  The vast majority of them use no encryption and ask for no authentication before carrying out sensitive functions such as running software updates and severing customers from the power grid.
                  http://www.theregister.co.uk/2009/06...ecurity_risks/
                  A third party security audit is the IT equivalent of a colonoscopy. It's long, intrusive, very uncomfortable, and when it's done, you'll have seen things you really didn't want to see, and you'll never forget that you've had one.

                  Comment


                  • #39
                    Re: Don't make the power grid smart: IT COULD GET HACKED!

                    http://blackhat.com/html/bh-usa-09/b...ers.html#Davis

                    Smart Grid. Smart Meters. AMI. Certainly no one has escaped the buzz surrounding this potentially ground-breaking technology. However, equally generating buzz is the heightened threat of attack these technologies provide. Mike Davis and a team of IOActive researchers were able to identify multiple programming errors on a series of Smart Meter platforms ranging from the inappropriate use of banned functions to protocol implementation issues. The team was able to “weaponize” these attack vectors, and create an in-flash rootkit, which allowed them to assume full system control of all exposed Smart Meter capabilities, including remote power on, power off, usage reporting, and communication configurations.

                    In this presentation, Davis will discuss the broad, yet almost ubiquitous exploits and basic design flaws in today’s Smart Meter and Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) technology. Typical attacker techniques such as buffer overflows, persistent and non-persistent root kits, and even self-propagating malicious software will be illustrated. Davis will even demonstrate a proof-of-concept worm attack and the general reverse engineering techniques used to achieve code execution. To show all is not hopeless, he will also cover the incident response impacts of possible worm attack scenario. Finally, building upon the analysis of the worm-able attack surface as well his hardware and software penetration testing research, Davis will suggest inherent design fixes that AMI vendors can implement to greatly mitigate these broad exploits.

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